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Religion has been used to justify the suppression of speech for
centuries . . . With the development of a vigorous First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, we have quelled some of the worst abuses.
But points of tension remain. We must thus remain vigilant to
ensure that in our rush to preserve certain fundamental rights,
we do not trample others. Caution is of the essence; only through
* Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Henry Lee Adams, Jr., United States Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Florida; University of Southern California
(J.D., 1996); University of California, Riverside (B.A., 1992); I thank Thomas Grif-
fith and Linda Beres for their help and encouragement in this process. I also




a methodical and fact-specific jurisprudence can we hope to
achieve proper accommodation.'
The case of Brittney K. Settle, a ninth-grade student whose
teacher forbade her from writing a research paper on the topic
of Jesus Christ, raises two points of tension: (1) the tension in
the classroom between the teacher's authority and a student's
freedom of expression, and (2) the supposed tension between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause. Settle's di-
lemma received national attention when the Supreme Court de-
nied review of her case, and sparked a debate on the proper
resolution of these conflicts. 2 Settle v. Dickson County School
Board3 demonstrates that teachers and school officials are unin-
formed regarding the scope of student's free speech rights in the
classroom. Especially in the case of religious speech, confusion
over what the Constitution permits and forbids has caused
school officials to take drastic measures tantamount to censor-
ship. The Sixth Circuit's decision in Settle aggravates the ever-
1. Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 526 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Poole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1173
(1995) (emphasis added).
2. See David C. Savage, Court Rejects Student Plea on Jesus as Topic, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1995, at Al; Tom Hirtz, High Court Lets Teachers Teach, PTr.
POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 1995, at B1; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Won't Hear Stu-
dent Who Sought to Write on Jesus, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 1995, at B3.
Representative James A. Trafficant (D-Ohio) spoke out on the House floor
against the Court's denial of review: "The Supreme Court ... says Jesus Christ is
not an appropriate topic. They sided with the school... Wake up, Congress! The
Constitution may separate church and state, but the Constitution never intended
to separate God and the American people." John McCaslin, Nation, Inside the
Beltway, THE WASH. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1995, at A7. House Representative Henry
Hyde (R-Ill.) invoked Settle's case to introduce the Religious Equality Amendment
on the House floor. See Religious Speech Challenge Rejected, FACTS ON FILE
WORLD NEWS, Nov. 30, 1995, at 889 C3.
Without specifically mentioning Settle's case, President Clinton gave a speech
on July 12, 1995, in which he stated that the First Amendment does not convert
schools into "religion-free zones." He urged that students should, "feel free to ex-
press their religion and their beliefs in homework, though art work, during class
presentations, as long as it is relevant to the assignment .... All these forms of
religious expression are permitted and protected by the First Amendment." Re-
marks by the President on Religious Liberty in America (The White House, Office
of the Press Secretary, July 12, 1995) at 6-8 (cited in Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari at 24, Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-
6207), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 518 (1995) (on file with author) (emphasis omitted)).
3. 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 518 (1995).
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growing intolerance toward religious speech in the public
schools.
Settle also highlights several unresolved issues concerning
student speech in the classroom. Numerous Supreme Court de-
cisions forbid viewpoint discrimination; however, none address
the doctrine in the context of the public school classroom. Two
Supreme Court cases-Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier4
and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict5-specifically address students' free speech rights, but
neither pertains to student speech in the forum of a classroom
assignment that does not implicate the school in the message.
Beyond the specific facts of these two cases, the free speech pro-
tection afforded students in the classroom remains uncertain.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Settle purports to apply Supreme
Court precedent, but fails to identify the free speech problem
posed by the facts of the case and creates an unlimited discre-
tion for teachers to restrict student speech. Had the Supreme
Court reviewed Settle, the Court could have clarified the analy-
sis to be used in such cases.
In denying review, the Supreme Court missed the opportu-
nity to define the limits of a teacher's discretion to restrict a
student's religious speech in the classroom. This article argues
that in the context of the classroom, courts should apply a fact-
intensive analysis comparable to the First Amendment prohibi-
tion against viewpoint discrimination. Part I reviews Supreme
Court precedent in relevant areas of First Amendment law.
Part II traces the facts and procedural history of Settle v. Dick-
son County School Board. Part III analyzes Settle under First
Amendment doctrine and explains the problems with the Sixth
Circuit's analysis. Part IV locates Settle within the current cli-
mate toward religious expression in the public schools, and Part
V recommends that courts take a proactive approach in apply-
ing First Amendment principles to classroom speech.
4. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).




A. The Free Speech Clause
Over the years the Supreme Court has developed the con-
tours of the Free Speech Clause contained in the First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 6 Justice Holmes first
described one theory of free speech as the "free trade in ideas,"
which requires that each thought be allowed to test its truth in
the marketplace. 7 To insure that the government is not unjusti-
fiably restricting a speaker's ability to express ideas, the Court
has determined that the First Amendment proscribes suppres-
sion of a particular message because of its content.8 The Court
has recognized as no less than ". . . axiomatic that the govern-
ment may not regulate speech based on its substantive content
or the message that it conveys."9 Further, the Supreme Court
acknowledges viewpoint discrimination as one of the para-
mount evils at odds with the liberties guaranteed by the Free
Speech Clause. Thus, the government may not target the par-
ticular ideology or perspective of the speaker. 10
Another important variable in the Free Speech Clause
analysis is whether a forum has been opened for the speech.
The context or the forum in which the speech occurs determines
the level of protection the speech will receive. The Supreme
Court inquires whether the speech takes place in a traditional
public forum, such as a street or park, a limited public forum,
such as a government facility that has been opened up to the
public, or a nonpublic forum." The government must justify
the restrictions on speech that occurs in the public forum with a
6. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging freedom of speech, or of the
press; or of the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
7. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (upholding convictions
for illegal incitement under the Espionage Act during World War I) (Holmes, J.,
and Brandeis, J., dissenting).
8. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
9. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828
(1995) (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
10. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-394 (1992).
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compelling state interest.12 Restrictions on speech in the non-
public forum, as long as they are not designed to suppress
speech because of the speaker's view, need only be reasonable. 13
1. Free Speech in the School Context
There are few cases in which the Supreme Court has ap-
plied the above principles to student expression within the
classroom. Settle relies on doctrines found in the following
cases which involve a public school student's right to express
particular views.
a. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District4
In Tinker, petitioners, one junior high and two high school
students, decided to participate in a program to publicize objec-
tion to the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands during the
Christmas holidays.' 5 Principals of the Des Moines schools be-
came aware of the students' planned protest and issued a policy
that any student wearing an armband would be first asked to
remove the armband, and if he refused, would be suspended un-
til he returned without it.16 Petitioners were suspended from
school for wearing the armbands, filed an action against the
schools for nominal damages and sought to enjoin their suspen-
sion.' 7 The district court dismissed the complaint, and the
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling without issuing an opinion.' 8
In an opinion by Justice Fortas, the Supreme Court identi-
fied the wearing of armbands as "closely akin to 'pure speech"'
protected by the First Amendment.' 9 The most notable aspect
of the Court's holding was its observation that neither the stu-
dents nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."20 Inevitable
12. See id. at 678.
13. See id. at 678-679.
14. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
15. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 504-505.
19. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.




conflict exists between the school's function as an arm of the
states to protect the "free mind at its source," and the school's
responsibility to proscribe and control conduct in the schools. 21
The Court struck the balance by requiring school officials to
show that the forbidden conduct would materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirement of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school, or would collide with the rights of
other students. 22
The district court made no such finding, and the Supreme
Court found no evidence in the record of potential disruption on
which the officials could have based their decision.23 Rather,
the record suggested that school officials feared controversy ac-
companying a protest against the Vietnam War.24 Further,
school officials did not silence all forms of protest, but merely
one particular opinion-the wearing of armbands.25 The Court
forbade schools from attempting in this manner to make stu-
dents "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate."26
b. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser27
Matthew Fraser, a student at Bethel High School, gave a
lewd and sexually suggestive speech at a school assembly.28
The morning after the assembly the Assistant Principal called
Fraser into her office and notified him that he had violated a
school rule against conduct which "materially and substantially
interferes with the educational process . . including the use of
obscene, profane language or gestures."29 Fraser was sus-
pended for three days and was no longer eligible to be a speaker
at graduation. 30 Fraser sued alleging a violation of his First
21. Id. at 507 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943) (upholding a student's First Amendment right to refuse to salute
the flag)).
22. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.
23. See id. at 509.
24. See id. at 510.
25. See id. at 510-511.
26. See id. at 511.
27. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
28. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 677-78.
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Amendment right to freedom of speech. 31 The district court
found that the school had violated Fraser's rights, awarded him
damages and attorney's fees, and enjoined the school from
preventing him from speaking at graduation. 32 The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Fraser's
expression was indistinguishable from the armband protest in
Tinker.33
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that schools, as in-
struments of the state, may determine that their message is im-
peded where lewd, indecent, or offensive speech is tolerated.34
The Court noted the marked distinction between the political
message at issue in Tinker and the sexual content of Fraser's
speech.35 Students as speakers do not share rights coextensive
with adults; thus, schools may regulate student speech that is
offensive, even though in other contexts, the state must let the
actor speak.36 Further, the Court noted that its precedent
reveals that a speaker's rights are not unlimited when the
speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include chil-
dren.37 Within the school environment, First Amendment pro-
tection for speech which undermines the school's basic
educational mission, and which contravenes the fundamental
values of public school education, is precluded.38
c. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier39
Students of the Hazelwood East High School Journalism II
class wrote and edited Spectrum, the school newspaper. 40 In
the May 13, 1983, edition of Spectrum, students prepared arti-
cles dealing with high school students' experiences with preg-
nancy and divorce in the family4' The journalism teacher and
31. See id. at 679.
32. See Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d at 1356 (9th Cir. 1985).
33. See id.
34. See id. at 680, 683.
35. See id. at 680.
36. See id. at 682 (comparing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (uphold-
ing a defendant's right to wear a profane, anti-draft viewpoint on his jacket inside
a state courthouse)).
37. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 684.
38. See id. at 685-86.
39. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
40. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262.
41. See id. at 263.
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
student advisor took page proofs to the Principal, who objected
to both articles, finding them to be inappropriate. 42 The Princi-
pal feared that the pregnancy article jeopardized the anonymity
of the girls described, and that the student's parents mentioned
in the divorce article should have been given the opportunity to
consent to the publication of the article or respond to the
information. 43
The Principal withheld from publication the two pages of
the newspaper containing the stories on pregnancy and divorce
without consulting the students." The students subsequently
sued in the district court for injunctive relief and monetary
damages, alleging that their First Amendment rights had been
violated. 45 The district court denied the injunction finding no
First Amendment violation. 46 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed, applying the Tinker standard and de-
termined that school officials could not have reasonably fore-
casted a material disruption or disorder as a result of the
articles. 47
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit decision.
Justice White concluded that school facilities may not be
deemed public forums unless school officials have opened the
facilities up for indiscriminate use by the general public.48 The
Court analyzed the school policies outlined in the Hazelwood
East Curriculum Guide. The guide stated inter alia that
"[sichool sponsored student publications [were] developed
within the adopted curriculum and its educational implica-
tions."4 9 This emphasis on the paper's role in the curriculum
failed to evince an intent by school officials to relinquish control
over Spectrum and create a public forum. Thus, the Court




44. See id. at 264.
45. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 596 F. Supp. 1422 (E.D. Mo.
1984).
46. See id. at 1423.
47. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F. 2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986).
48. See id. at 268 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S at 47).
49. Id. at 268.
50. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
262 [Vol. 18:255
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The Court noted that the question in Hazelwood, whether a
school must affirmatively promote a particular student speech,
differed from the question in Tinker, which addressed an educa-
tor's ability to silence a student's personal expression that oc-
curs on school premises. 51 Rather, Hazelwood concerns an
educator's authority over school-sponsored publications, theatri-
cal productions, and other expressive activities that students, par-
ents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to
bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may fairly be
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not
they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are
supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences. 52
The Court reasoned that educators should have greater
control over this type of material for three reasons: (1) to insure
that participants learn the lesson the activity was designed to
teach; (2) so that readers or listeners will not be exposed to ma-
terial that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity; and
(3) so that the views of the speaker will not be erroneously at-
tributed to the school. 53 In light of these considerations, the
Court held that "educators do not offend the First Amendment
by exercising editorial control over the style and content of stu-
dent speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogi-
cal concerns."54 Applying this standard, the Court concluded
that the Principal's deleting the articles was "reasonable under
the circumstances as he understood them."55
In a dissenting opinion Justice Brennan highlighted a dif-
ferent section of the Hazelwood Guide which described Spec-
trum as a "forum established to give students an opportunity to
express their views while gaining an appreciation of their rights
and responsibilities under the First Amendment[.]" 56 Justice
Brennnan stated that the school officials violated the First
Amendment's prohibitions against censorship of student ex-
51. See id. at 270-71.
52. Id. at 271.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
55. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276.




pression that neither disrupts class work nor invades the rights
of others. Moreover, the censorship was not narrowly tailored
to serve its educational purpose.5 7
2. Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination
The Supreme Court has decided several cases discussing
the protection which the First Amendment affords religious
speech. Settle's classroom assignment falls within this category
of speech because of the religious topic she choose.
a. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia58
The Supreme Court determined the issue of whether the
University of Virginia could deny funding to a student-run reli-
gious newspaper. In Rosenberger, undergraduate students at
the University of Virginia established Wide Awake Productions
which published a newspaper titled, Wide Awake: A Christian
Perspective at the University of Virginia.59 The University re-
fused to fund Wide Awake's printing costs because it was a reli-
gious organization. 60 Wide Awake appealed the denial first to
the Student Council, and then to the Student Activities Com-
mittee, arguing that it was an organization entitled to funding,
and refusing financial support violated the Constitution.6
1
When the University refused Wide Awake's appeals, Wide
Awake filed suit in the district court challenging the Univer-
sity's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the grounds that Wide
Awake's rights to free speech and press, free exercise of religion,
and to equal protection of the law, had been violated. 62 The dis-
trict court ruled in favor of the University, and the Fourth Cir-
cuit concluded that although Virginia discriminated on the
basis of content, the discrimination was necessary to achieve
the "compelling interest in maintaining strict separation of
church and state."63
57. See id. at 278.
58. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
59. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825-26.
60. See id. at 827.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 827.
63. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visi-
tors of Univ. of Virginia, 18 F.3d 269, 281 (4th Cir. 1994)).
264 [Vol. 18:255
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss2/1
19981 STUDENT-INITIATED RELIGIOUS SPEECH
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found that Vir-
ginia discriminated on the basis of content.64 In a limited public
forum that the government has created, it may discriminate on
the basis of content to preserve the purpose of that forum. It
may not, however, discriminate among the viewpoints. 65 Jus-
tice Kennedy explained that religion is a viewpoint:
It is, in a sense, something of an understatement to speak of reli-
gious thought and discussion as just a viewpoint, as distinct from
a comprehensive body of thought. The nature of our origins and
destiny and their dependence on the existence of a divine being
have been subjects of philosophical inquiry throughout human
history. We conclude, nonetheless, that here, as in Lamb's
Chapel, viewpoint discrimination is the proper way to interpret
the University's objections to Wide Awake. 66
The Supreme Court further found that there could be no
violation of the Establishment Clause where Virginia would
merely be carrying out its responsibilities under the Free
Speech Clause.67 Hence, the Court invalidated Virginia's denial
of funding to Wide Awake. 68
b. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District69
Similarly, in Lamb's Chapel, the Court held unconstitu-
tional a school district's refusal of its school grounds to a reli-
gious group.70 Lamb's Chapel sought to use school facilities
after hours to show a Christian film series by Dr. James Dobson
discussing family issues. Center Moriches school district gener-
ally allowed the community to use the school facilities for "so-
cial, civic, or recreational use," but denied Lamb's Chapel the
right to use school facilities because it was a religious group.71
Justice White invalidated the restriction on free speech
grounds, noting that because films dealing with the same sub-
ject matter from a nonreligious perspective could be shown, the
64. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-31.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 831.
67. See id. at 845-46.
68. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46.
69. 504 U.S. 384 (1993).
70. See Lamb's Chapel, 504 U.S. at 394.




denial amounted to viewpoint discrimination.7 2 The Court rec-
ognized that even in a nonpublic forum the government may not
discriminate among views.7 3
B. The Religion Clauses
The First Amendment not only guarantees freedom of
speech, but also protects the free exercise of religion and concur-
rently proscribes a state-instituted establishment of religion.7 4
Settle involved the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
because of the religious nature of Settle's expression.7 5 The fol-
lowing cases pertain to religious expression under the religion
clauses of the First Amendment.
1. Free Exercise
The Free Exercise Clause protects an individual's right to
practice his or her religion, as well as the right to be free from
religious persecution. In the same term as Lamb's Chapel the
Supreme Court decided Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah,76 which addressed the issue of religious perse-
cution. Hialeah, Florida, in anticipation of the Santeria religion
establishing a church in the area, enacted laws prohibiting
animal sacrifice and specific types of animal slaughter utilized
by the Santeria religion. 77 The Supreme Court invalidated the
Hialeah laws as violative of Lukumi's free exercise of religion.78
Justice Kennedy stated that the government "may not enact
laws that suppress religious belief or practice." 79 He explained
that the Court granted review out of concern that the laws in
question violated "this fundamental nonpersecution principle of
72. See id. at 393-95.
73. See id. at 392-93.
74. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
75. The Sixth Circuit considered neither the Establishment nor Free Exercise
Clause because Settle did not challenge Ramsey's actions on those grounds. See
Settle, 53 F.3d at 153. The district court similarly stated that the religion clauses
of the First Amendment were not implicated by the facts of Settle's case. See Pet.
for Writ of Cert. at App. 29, Settle, (No. 93-207).
76. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
77. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 525-26.
78. See id. at 535.
79. Id. at 523.
[Vol. 18:255266
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss2/1
19981 STUDENT-INITIATED RELIGIOUS SPEECH
the First Amendment." 0 The Supreme Court articulated and
applied the test for free exercise cases, which requires that a
law burdening religion be (1) neutral in its application, and (2)
generally applicable to all conduct.8' A law which is not neutral
nor generally applicable must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest.8 2
The Court found that Hialeah's laws were not neutral.8 3 In
determining whether the ordinances targeted the Santeria reli-
gion the Court looked beyond the face of the laws to the laws'
operation.8 4 Practically, the Santeria religious practices were
the only conduct subject to the ordinances. Further, evidence
surrounding the city council's meetings, including statements
made therein, demonstrated an intent by the city to prevent
Lukumi from practicing its religion in the city.
The Supreme Court next considered the second require-
ment of the Free Exercise Clause; that the laws be generally
applicable.85 The Court found that the laws were underinclu-
sive of their stated goals of protecting public health and
preventing cruelty to animals because Hialeah failed to prohibit
similar nonreligious conduct.8 6 Rather, the ordinances were
carefully drafted to include only killings related to animal
sacrifice.8 7
Finally, the Court found that the Hialeah laws were insuffi-
ciently narrowly tailored to pass the strict scrutiny require-
ment. The ordinances failed to address the goals of public
health and preventing cruelty to animals with respect to analo-
gous nonreligious conduct.88 Further, Hialeah could have
achieved those goals using far narrower laws.8 9 Thus the
Supreme Court struck down the ordinances as violative of the
Free Exercise Clause.90
80. Id.
81. See id. at 531-32 (citing Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
82. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32.
83. See id. at 533-34.
84. See id. at 534-35.
85. See id. at 542-43.
86. See id. at 543.
87. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.
88. See id. at 546-47.
89. See id.




2. The Establishment Clause
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that under
the Establishment Clause the government may not favor or dis-
favor religion. In an early school case, Epperson v. Arkansas,91
the Supreme Court invalidated an Arkansas criminal statute
which forbade the instruction of evolution in the classroom. 92
The Court found that the Arkansas law prohibited the instruc-
tion of evolution for the sole reason that it conflicted with a par-
ticular religious doctrine.93 The Court observed that the study
of religions and of the Bible presented objectively as a part of a
secular program need not collide with the Establishment
Clause. However, the State may not adopt programs which "aid
or oppose" any religion.94 Thus, "the First Amendment 'does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom."' 95
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,96 the Supreme Court defined the
current test under the Establishment Clause which requires
the law in question: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a prin-
ciple effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3)
does not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion.97 In cases of religious speech, the Establishment
Clause affects the free speech analysis. The Supreme Court has
recognized the critical difference between "government speech
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids,
and private speech endorsing religion which the Free Speech
91. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
92. See generally id.
93. See id. at 103.
94. See id. at 103-04.
95. Id. at 105 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
96. 403 U.S. 602 (1973).
97. See id. at 612. Because of the difficulty the Court has had in applying the
Lemon test, its continued validity has been questioned; however, the Supreme
Court has explicitly declined to overrule Lemon. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at
395, n.7. The proposition that the First Amendment requires government neutral-
ity toward religion remains the essential concern of the Establishment Clause.
See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46 ("[Tlhe University's regulation [which]
required public officials to scan and interpret student publications to discern their
underlying philosophic assumptions respecting religious theory and belief.., was
a denial of the right of free speech and would risk fostering a pervasive bias or
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and Free Exercise Clauses protect."98 Thus, whether the Estab-
lishment Clause forbids religious speech in the classroom de-
pends upon the extent to which that speech is endorsed by the
state or its actor.
II. Settle v. Dickson County School Board
A. Facts
During the week of March 15, 1991, Brittney Settle, a
ninth-grader at Dickson County Junior High School in the
small town of Dickson, Tennessee, received a research assign-
ment in her English class. 99 Settle's instructor, Dana Ramsey,
allowed Settle and other students to select their own topics sub-
ject to Ramsey's approval, and required four research sources
comprised of original and secondary material, including news-
paper and magazine articles. 100 Ramsey required only that stu-
dents' topics be "interesting, researchable, and decent."1 1
Students chose topics such as reincarnation, including its rela-
tion to Hinduism and Buddhism, witchcraft, black magic and
the occult, ghosts, and supernatural encounters with dead per-
sons, all of which were approved by Ramsey. 10 2
Settle had originally signed up to do a paper on "Drama."10 3
On March 22, Ramsey removed the in-class sign up sheet after
which time students could change their topics with her ap-
proval. 10 4 Deciding that "Drama" might be too broad and not
sufficiently interesting, Settle changed her topic and on March
26 submitted an outline entitled, "The Life of Jesus Christ."10 5
Ramsey immediately rejected the outline, expressing her dis-
comfort with the choice of Jesus as a research topic. 10 6 On April
98. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 250 (emphasis omitted).
99. See Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 153 (6th Cir. 1995).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 3, Settle, (No. 93-6207). For example, the
paper topic "Magic Throughout History" included sources entitled "Jews believe in
Baal," "Demons Are Evil Spirits," and "Gods Are Good Spirits." See Settle, No. 91-
0562, slip op. at App. 21 n.1 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
103. See Settle, 53 F.3d at 154.
104. See id. at 153-54.





3, Settle submitted a second outline, this time entitled, "A Sci-
entific and Historical Approach to the Life of Jesus Christ."10 7
Ramsey again rejected the topic.'08 Settle's father, Jerry Settle,
complained to Ramsey, and later met with Ramsey and the
school principal, Reed Evans, who supported Ramsey's deci-
sion.10 9 Mr. Settle also called the superintendent of the Dickson
County school system, George Caudill, who affirmed Ramsey's
actions. 10
Ramsey offered several reasons for her decision, namely: (1)
Settle's failure to obtain permission for the topic in advance
warranted its refusal; (2) Settle's personal views would prevent
her from writing a dispassionate paper and cause Settle to per-
ceive any commentary as criticism of her religion; (3) "personal
religion is just not an appropriate thing to do in a public
school;""' (4) Settle's knowledge of Jesus Christ would prevent
her from learning something new and discourage her from con-
ducting significant research; (5) the law prohibits any discus-
sion of religious issues in the classroom; and (6) Settle could not
meet the four source requirement because the Bible is the only
available source on the reading of Jesus Christ. 112
On the day that the papers were due Settle handed in her
paper entitled, "The Life of Jesus Christ."" 3 Ramsey gave Set-
tle a zero without reading the paper."14
B. Procedural History
1. District Court
Settle brought a Civil Rights action in the district court for
the Middle District of Tennessee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
107. See id.
108. See Settle, 53 F.3d at 154.
109. See Settle, No. 91-0562, slip op. at App. 21-22.
110. See Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 3, Settle, (No. 93-6207) at 4.
111. Settle, 53 F.3d at 154.
112. See id. Settle claimed that Ramsey's sole reason for rejecting her outline
was its religious content, and that Ramsey offered additional justifications only
after her decision in subsequent statements to the school board and at her deposi-
tions. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 5 n.3, Settle, (No. 93-6207). This article addresses all
reasons given by Ramsey as a potential part of the basis for her decision.
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for injunctive relief against the Dickson County School Board.115
Settle claimed that her freedom of speech rights were violated
when she was not allowed to write her research paper on the
life of Jesus Christ. 1 6 Settle also claimed that Ramsey violated
the Dickson County policy on "Religion in the Curriculum"
when she denied the paper." 7 Additionally, Settle argued that
the Dickson County School failed to maintain a neutral position
toward religion, violating the Establishment Clause."18
Judge Wiseman stated the "two methods" 19 of analysis to
be applied when dealing with student speech in public schools,
citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 20 Follow-
ing a Tinker analysis, courts examine whether a student's per-
sonal expression on school premises materially and
substantially interferes with the school's function or the rights
of other students.' 2' The Hazelwood test applies a reasonable-
ness standard to determine whether a school must accept a stu-
dent's particular form of speech in a school sponsored setting.122
Judge Wiseman distinguished Tinker as applying to per-
sonal expression and found the Hazelwood standard to be more
appropriate. 123 Settle's paper was part of the school's curricu-
lum, designed to teach research and writing skills. 124 Addition-
ally, the court considered Ramsey's reasons to be legitimate
pedagogical concerns. 25 The court emphasized Settle's failure
to follow procedure and Ramsey's concern that Settle might be
able to write a paper on Jesus Christ more easily than another
subject. 26 Further, the court accepted Ramsey's argument that
a ninth grade student would be particularly sensitive to any
115. See Settle, No. 91-0562, slip op. at App. 19.
116. See id.
117. See id. at App. 27.
118. See Settle, No. 91-0562, slip op. at App. 28.
119. Part III, infra, questions the assumption that there are two discrete
methods of analysis in this area.
120. 393 U.S. 503 (1969); 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
121. See Settle, No. 91-0562, slip op. at App. 23.
122. See id. at App. 23-24; see also discussion infra Part II.A.2.
123. See Settle, No. 91-0562, slip op. at App. 25.
124. See id.
125. See id. at App. 26-27.
126. See Settle, No. 91-0562, slip op. at App. 25-26.
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criticism of work containing personal religious beliefs. 127 Thus,
Dickson Junior High was not bound to accept Settle's speech. 128
The district court rejected Settle's claim that Ramsey vio-
lated the Dickson County Board of Education "Religion in the
Curriculum" policy. 29 The court agreed with Ramsey's interpre-
tation of "composition" as an assignment that contains "per-
sonal experiences and observations" as opposed to what the
instant assignment was: an objective research paper. 130 This in-
terpretation, the court held, was reasonable, "comport[ed] with
the learning objective of the exercise," had a valid pedagogical
justification," and therefore did not violate the written policy.' 3'
Similarly, the court disposed of Settle's claim that Ramsey and
the school "failed to maintain a benevolent neutrality" toward
religion. 132 The court distinguished a research paper from idea
expression and found that the former need not accommodate a
student's religious faith.133 The district court entered summary
127. See id. at App. 26. Ramsey testified that criticism of a fourteen year old's
written work intertwined with personal religious values would lead to the stu-
dent's assumption that, "[the teacher] just [doesn't] agree with me; therefore,
that's why I got a bad grade." Id. at App. 26-27.
128. See id. at App. 25, 29.
129. See id. at App. 27-28. The written policy states in pertinent part:
Religious institutions and orientations are central to human experience,
both past and present. An education excluding such a significant aspect
would be incomplete. It is essential that the teaching about - religion and
not of religion be conducted in a factual, objective, and respectful manner.
Therefore the policy of the Board of Education shall be as follows:
(1) The Board supports the inclusion of religious literature, music, drama
and the arts in the curriculum and in school activities, provided it is
intrinsic to the learning experience in the various fields of study and
presented objectively.
(2) The emphasis on the religious themes in the arts, literature and history
should be only as extensive as necessary for a balanced and comprehen-
sive study of these areas. Such studies shall never foster any particular
religious tenets or demean any religious beliefs.
(3) Student-initiated expressions to questions or assignments which reflect
their beliefs or non-beliefs about a religious theme shall be accommo-
dated. For example, students are free to express religious belief or non-
belief in compositions, art, music, speech, and debate.
Id.
130. See id. at App. 28.
131. See Settle, No. 91-0562, slip op. at App. at 28.
132. Id. (quoting Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
133. See id.
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss2/1
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judgment for the school. 34 Settle thereafter appealed to the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 135
2. Court of Appeals
The Sixth Circuit held that all six of Ramsey's justifications
for rejecting Settle's paper were within the "broad leeway of
teachers to determine the nature of the curriculum and the
grades to be awarded students."13 6 Judge Merit, writing for the
majority, emphasized that courts should exercise restraint in
classroom conflicts between teacher and student due to the need
for effective education. 37 The court reasoned that even in Ha-
zelwood where a student was denied access to a school newspa-
per, a "kind of open forum," the Supreme Court allowed
educators to censor the style and context of student speech, so
long as the regulation was reasonably related to legitimate ped-
agogical concerns. 38 Further, the court found that Tinker al-
lowed teachers broad discretion when administering the
curriculum. Thus, a school may limit otherwise protected
speech if it does so as part of a prescribed classroom exercise. ' 39
Judge Merritt compared teachers to judges, who must fre-
quently direct the content of speech. 40 Teachers may make mis-
takes in grading, just as judges make mistakes in deciding
cases, but it is the "essence of the teacher's responsibility in the
classroom to draw lines and make distinctions."' 4 1 Judge Mer-
ritt concluded that within these competing interests, learning is
more vital in the classroom than free speech.' 42
Judge Batchelder concurred in the court's decision, but dis-
agreed with the majority's assessment of the facts and the value
placed on free speech in schools. First, he noted that Settle's
134. See id. at App. 29.
135. See Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 518 (1995).
136. Id. at 156.
137. See id. at 155.
138. See id. at 155 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273). Although an ordinary
newspaper would qualify as an "open forum," the Supreme Court clearly identified
the high school newspaper in Hazelwood as a nonpublic forum. See Hazelwood, 484
U.S. at 269-70.
139. See id. at 156 (interpreting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
140. See Settle, 53 F.3d at 155.
141. Id. at 155-56.




case did not state a First Amendment free speech claim, and
was not workable within the framework of cases such as Hazel-
wood and Tinker.143 Unlike the student material in Hazelwood,
Settle's paper was not for the publication of a school sanctioned
newspaper, but solely to fulfill an assignment in English class.
Nor was the research paper an expression of opinion or "pure
expression" which happened to take place in the classroom as in
Tinker. The issue according to the concurrence was solely
whether a ninth grade English teacher can determine what
topic is appropriate to satisfy a research paper assigned in that
class: "The bottom line is that when a teacher makes an assign-
ment, even if she does it poorly, the student has no constitu-
tional right to do something other than the assignment and
receive credit for it." 144 Although disturbed by Ramsey's after-
the-fact reasons for denying the paper, particularly Ramsey's
belief that religion should not be discussed in schools, the con-
currence concluded that because Settle's was not an opinion pa-
per, Ramsey did not reject the paper solely on the ground of its
religious content. 145
Settle appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court denied Settle's petition for writ of
certiorari. 46
III. Analysis Under Current Doctrine
A. Freedom of Speech
The district court began its analysis with the assumption
that Settle's case must fit into one of two analytical categories:
Hazelwood or Tinker.47 These cases only constitute a part of
the solution to the question posed by Settle. Settle offered the
Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve the difficult question
of the extent to which a teacher may restrict the expression of
certain subjects and views in her classroom. Neither Tinker nor
Hazelwood directly address this issue.
143. See id. at 157-58.
144. Id. at 158.
145. See Settle, 53 F.3d at 159.
146. See Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 116 S. Ct. 518 (1995).
147. See Settle, No. 91-0562, slip op. at App. 22.
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The Sixth Circuit identified the components which make
Settle a difficult and distinguishable case from Hazelwood or
Tinker. At one extreme, the Sixth Circuit recognized the basic
proposition that a teacher cannot limit speech to punish a stu-
dent for her race, gender, class or religion. 148 At the other ex-
treme, the court concluded that learning is more vital in the
classroom than free speech. 149 Somewhere in the middle the
Sixth Circuit found an area of "broad discretion" reserved to the
teacher alone. 50 The court relied on dicta from earlier Supreme
Court school cases' 5 ' and found that both Hazelwood and
Tinker could be used to support broad discretion for teachers to
limit classroom speech. 152 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit failed
to explain the practical limits of a teacher's discretion to restrict
speech, and failed to apply those limits to Settle's case.
Had the Supreme Court granted review in Settle, it could
have defined the precise analysis to be applied in similar cases.
Further, the Court could have defined a teacher's discretion to
discriminate among views in the classroom. This article at-
tempts to outline the parameters of a teacher's discretion to re-
strict speech consistent with First Amendment principles.
1. Relevance of the forum
Traditionally, the Court begins the free speech analysis
with an evaluation of the forum created for speech. The
Supreme Court has not created a per se forum category for
schools. The Court characterized the high school newspaper at
issue in Hazelwood as a nonpublic forum.15 3 If the school has by
148. See Settle, 53 F.3d at 155. Although the court recognized that a teacher
could conceivably punish a student because of her religion by assigning a low
grade, the court did not articulate how such discrimination could be proven, and
discarded Settle's claim made at oral argument that Ramsey punished Settle for
her religion. See id.
149. See id. at 156.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 155. The court cited Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(holding unconstitutional as a violation of the Establishment Clause an Arkansas
"monkey law" which forbade the instruction of evolution in public schools) and
Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (finding no
violation of a medical student's substantive due process where she was dismissed
for academic deficiency without a hearing).
152. See Settle, 53 F.3d at 155-56.




policy or by practice opened facilities for indiscriminate public
use will it be deemed a limited public forum. 54 However, if no
public forum has been created the school may impose reason-
able restrictions on student speech. 155
On the other hand, some scholars view the standard articu-
lated in Tinker as exclusive of any consideration of the forum. 156
Similarly, Settle likely interpreted Tinker as the only mecha-
nism to invoke the viewpoint discrimination principles that she
claimed Dickson Junior High violated. The "material and sub-
stantial interference" standard in Tinker creates a stricter bar-
rier for the school to overcome than that of "reasonableness."
However, even in Tinker, the Court conducted its analysis "in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment."15 7
This implies that the Court considered the competing interests
of the government and the speaker implicit in the forum
doctrine. 158
A logical reason exists for the Supreme Court's disparate
standards in Hazelwood and Tinker. In Tinker, school officials
prevented students from wearing armbands on their persons,
expression akin to "pure speech." In other words, the students
in Tinker did not use the school facilities or curriculum to de-
liver their message. The silent protest took place during school
hours and on school premises, even in the classroom, but the
students' antiwar message did not impede the school's ability to
perform its function. Additionally, the students' message, con-
veyed by the armbands which individual students wore on their
persons, was not likely to have been attributed to the school. By
contrast, the students in Hazelwood could not deliver their
message without the aid of the school newspaper. The fact that
the newspaper was part of the curriculum as well as the fact
154. See id. at 267 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 47).
155. See id. at 267.
156. See Jay Alan Sekulow et al., Proposed Guidelines for Student Religious
Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1017, 1034 (1995)
[hereinafter Sekulow]. Sekulow argues that a forum analysis would diminish the
protection of students' speech rights which Tinker affords. Rather, students' rights
would be subject to the "vagaries of school officials," allowing those officials to re-
strict speech as long as the restrictions are reasonable. See id. at 1034.
157. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
158. See ISKCON, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992).
276 [Vol. 18:255
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss2/1
19981 STUDENT-INITIATED RELIGIOUS SPEECH 277
that its message could easily have been attributed to the school
compelled the Court to find the newspaper a nonpublic forum.
Hazelwood examined three concerns with respect to speech
within the curriculum. The Court stated one body of concern,
that students learn the activity the class was designed to teach,
and another, discussed above, that the school maintain control
over work perceived by the public to bear the imprimatur of the
school. 15 9 Hazelwood applies to this case based on Ramsey's
concern that Settle might not learn to prepare a research paper.
It is less clear that the public could perceive Settle's paper to be
the product of Dickson Junior High.160 Additionally, the censor-
ship in Hazelwood aimed to protect the young readers to whom
the school paper was circulated. In this case, Settle's paper
could not have adversely affected any other students. Conse-
quently, the high level of deference afforded the school officials
in Hazelwood does not apply to these facts.
However, Settle's paper was part of the school curriculum,
an area generally not open for unlimited student expression. In
this particular assignment Ramsey allowed students to choose
their own research, but retained the right to approve and grade
the topics. Thus, under current doctrine, the facts of Settle sug-
gest a nonpublic forum and, following Hazelwood, Ramsey's ac-
tions must be reasonably related to pedagogical concerns.
2. Viewpoint discrimination
After analyzing the type of forum in which speech occurs,
the Court determines whether the state has discriminated
based on the content of the speech or the viewpoint of the
speaker. In most contexts, even in the nonpublic forum, view-
159. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
160. Peck explains the function of the forum in distinguishing between pro-
tected religious expression and prohibited religious worship in the school context.
Where a public forum has been established, and students are free to express them-
selves on any topic, whatever is expressed is more easily attributed to the student-
speaker than the school. It can be inferred from his analysis that, where whatever
is expressed is attributed to the student-speaker, a public forum has been estab-
lished. He explains that a student in biology class may answer a question about
evolution with a statement about the Bible because of the forum that has been
created. Robert S. Peck, The Threat to the American Idea of Religious Liberty, 46
MERCER L. REV. 1123, 1152 (1995) [hereinafter Peck].
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point discrimination cannot be justified. 161 Settle relied on this
point in her brief, stating that "[e]ven if school officials need not
have permitted expression of any student views," or "could have
imposed viewpoint-neutral subject matter restrictions on what
topics students could address, it does not follow that schools
may prohibit . . . student expression on particular topics be-
cause of the religious viewpoint that such a topic is thought to
entail."162 Ramsey's outright rejection of Settle's religious topic
would appear to be an indisputable example of content and
viewpoint discrimination. Ramsey objected to Settle's paper be-
cause of its religious theme, and specifically forbade her from
writing on Jesus Christ because of Settle's strongly held beliefs.
Even if Ramsey had prohibited all students from writing on a
religious topic, her actions would have amounted to viewpoint
discrimination. For purposes of free speech, the Court has rec-
ognized that the silencing of all viewpoints on a topic is just as
offensive as silencing a single viewpoint. 163 Therefore, it would
seem as Settle argued in her brief to the Supreme Court, that
Ramsey prevented Settle from writing on Jesus Christ "because
of the particular religious viewpoint the instructor considered
the topic to present and because the instructor thought the
choice of topic reflected Brittney Settle's personal religious
views and interests."64
The foregoing fora and viewpoint analyses demonstrate
that the issue of student speech in the classroom is far from
resolved by these doctrines. A per se prohibition against view-
point discrimination in the school context is unworkable be-
cause, as the Sixth Circuit recognized, "it is the essence of the
teacher's responsibility in the classroom to draw lines and make
distinctions . . . to encourage speech germane to the topic at
hand and discourage speech unlikely to shed light on the sub-
ject." 65 Yet, to allow viewpoint discrimination because a class-
room or assignment is not designated a public forum by the
school would provide little protection for students. Courts could
161. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-393 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
162. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 13, Settle, (No. 93-6207) (emphasis in original).
163. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518.
164. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 10-11, Settle, (No. 93-6207) (emphasis added).
165. Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 156 (1995).
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never discern when a teacher limits speech "in the name of
learning" or "as a pretext for punishing the student for her race,
gender, economic class, religion or political persuasion."1 66 The
unique setting of the classroom creates the critical difference
between Settle and cases like Rosenberger,67 in which the
Supreme Court swiftly struck down a university funding policy
based on viewpoint discrimination.
B. Speech in the Classroom
Teachers may have valid educational reasons for limiting
the expression of views. The Supreme Court has recognized
that a teacher may proscribe a morally offensive presentation to
protect students from sexually explicit messages which conflict
with the school's message of decency and appropriate citizen-
ship. 168 Further, a teacher may stifle a student's message that is
not harmful but simply interferes with the school's function. 169
As Justice Brennan stated, the teacher may not bar the budding
political orator from the cafeteria but may punish him for giving
a speech in calculus class.170 Settle perceived the problem inher-
ent in judicial review of classroom decisions but failed to ex-
plain where the boundaries should be drawn:
It is important to emphasize what is not at issue in this case.
Students have no free speech right to dictate the content of a pub-
lic school's curriculum and petitioner does not contend otherwise.
Nor do students have a general constitutional right to object to a
teacher's (or school's) control over the content and manner of
classroom instruction or discussions, including the subjects cho-
sen and, very often, even the viewpoints expressed by students.
Teachers and school districts properly are granted substantial lat-
itude on such matters. Moreover, even where a school district (or
its teacher) has chosen to allow students to write research papers
or essays, or make classroom presentations, on subjects of a stu-
dent's choosing, the school or teacher may impose limitations on
the student's choices for reasons of age-appropriateness, decency,
166. Settle, 53 F.3d at 156.
167. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2510.
168. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 675.
169. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
170. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Consoli-





relevance, degree-of-difficulty, lack of originality, duplication of
other students' efforts or previous class work, or any other valid
educational reason. This case challenges none of these
principles.171
The context of the classroom requires a closer inspection of
the teacher's actions to determine whether the teacher has vio-
lated a student's freedom of expression. To evaluate the valid-
ity of a teacher's restriction on speech, courts must assess the
restriction as well as the manner in which the teacher applies
the restriction to the class. Even under the Hazelwood standard
courts must evaluate whether a teacher's decision reasonably
squares with the "legitimate pedagogical concerns." 172 There-
fore, courts must actually determine whether a teacher's ac-
tions are not merely reasonable, but reasonably related to
pedagogy-"the art, profession, or science of teaching."173
An analysis of different hypotheticals and categories of
speech may clarify the parameters of a teacher's discretion
within the classroom.
1. Types of Classroom Speech
a. Oral Presentations
In the case of oral presentations, teachers are primarily
concerned with the message a student conveys to other stu-
dents. Suppose for example that a student wished to fulfill an
oral report assignment on a topic of the student's choice by giv-
ing a speech on the tenets of Nazism. The student would have a
free speech right to express herself in the manner she chose pro-
vided that the report was relevant to the assignment. The
teacher, however, would probably have the responsibility to sep-
arate the school from the message and protect other students
from a potentially injurious presentation. 174 On the other hand,
171. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 11, Settle, (No. 93-6207).
172. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
173. WEBSTER'S II NEW REVISED DIcTIoNARY 517 (1984).
174. This assertion flows from the Court's repeated reluctance to grant stu-
dents the rights that adults have to promote offensive messages. See Bethel, 478
U.S. at 681-82; see also Papish v. University of Mo. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667,
670-71 n.6 (1973) (upholding expulsion of a student for lewd expression in a news-
paper she sold on campus); c.f New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (noting
that the constitutional rights of students in public schools are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings).
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where little danger exists of imputing the student's message to
the school or harming other students, a teacher should not re-
strict a student's expression because of its content. Thus, for
example, a teacher should not punish a student's relevant an-
swer to a question simply because that answer conveys a reli-
gious or philosophical viewpoint. 175
b. Written Assignments
In terms of a student's written work, it follows that a
teacher should not forbid an otherwise relevant assignment be-
cause of its particular view. As one commentator notes:
Suppose a teacher tells his class to write a book report on
Moby Dick. A student could receive an "F" for submitting a report
on another book-for example, the book of Jonah in the Bible, be-
cause it, like Moby Dick, involves a whale-because a teacher
may legitimately expect students to complete the assignment the
teacher assigns, and to reward work that does not meet that ex-
pectation would materially disrupt the teacher's legitimate pur-
pose. But suppose a student handed in a report that drew
parallels between Moby Dick and religious imagery. The teacher
could not punish the student (for example, by assigning a lower
grade) simply because of the report's religious viewpoint.176
When a teacher's restriction applies to the entire class, the
mere exclusion of a particular subject summons the specter of
discrimination and makes the teacher's motives suspect. Con-
sider the following variation on a hypothetical posed by Profes-
sor Michael McConnell. 177 Suppose a teacher forbids her class
from submitting papers on matters related to race. A black stu-
The teacher's actions would not be justified solely because of the offensiveness
of the Nazi message. See National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977)
(overturning an Illinois injunction against a Nazi demonstration in a largely Jew-
ish community); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding
unconstitutional as a prohibited point of view restriction a law which proscribed
cross-burning).
175. See Sekulow, supra, note 156 at 1075.
176. Id. at 1075-76.
177. McConnell testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in opposition
to the pending school prayer amendment but in defense of religious liberty in
schools. He commented with respect to Settle's case: "I have little doubt that the
case would have come out the other way if a racist teacher had forbidden a paper
on Martin Luther King, Jr., or an anticommunist teacher had forbidden a paper on
the evils of capitalism." Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony of Michael W. McConnell




dent who desired to write a paper on Malcolm X would be pre-
vented from doing so based on the policy. Forbidding the
student from writing on the topic might effectively punish the
student for his or her race. Prohibiting any discussion of race
would restrict the views available in the marketplace. It would
reduce Malcolm X to a "racial matter," and undermine his sig-
nificance as a subject of history deserving of thoughtful,
researched analysis. It would also reveal that the teacher holds
a bias against the student's viewpoint on the subject. To many
Christians, Ramsey's decision to reject Settle's paper seems just
as anti-religious as the above examples seem racist.178
c. Creative v. Noncreative Writing
Finally, the distinction between creative and noncreative
writing merits some discussion. Presumably, in a creative writ-
ing environment, students should have more latitude to choose
their own topics. Conversely, research papers or noncreative
writing might warrant less student choice and heightened
teacher scrutiny. Ramsey relied on this reasoning in rejecting
Settle's topic. 17 9 From a learning perspective, however, the re-
search paper and the creative essay may have much in common.
Both teach writing skills which require the learning and in-
volvement of the student. A topic in which the student has an
interest should produce, if properly managed, a paper that is a
product of the student's active involvement in the learning pro-
cess-the object of the English classroom. 80
178. Had there been a recent racial controversy in the schools and had the
students been required to give oral presentations, the teacher here, as in the Nazi
example, supra, might argue that restricting the presentation would be necessary
to protect sensitive students and avoid classroom conflict.
179. See Pet. for Writ of Cert. at App. 27-28, Settle (No. 93-6207).
180. Some argue that writing in the English classroom has lost its focus on
the students' role in the "process" of writing. Kutz and Roskelly explain that too
often format takes priority over the student's active involvement: "[S]tudents[]
[believe] that writing is a task quite separate from themselves, with right and
wrong answers determined by the authority of the teacher." ELEANOR KUTz &
HEPHZIBAH ROSKELLY, AN UNQUIET PEDAGOGY 155-56 (1991). Thus, "[w]riting in
school is most often seen by students not as an active means of discovering what
they think and know, but as a routine and essentially passive kind of decoding,
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These observations suggest that courts can evaluate the le-
gitimacy of a teacher's classroom decision to restrict speech.
However, in Settle, the Sixth Circuit failed to evaluate Ramsey's
decision for the possibility of viewpoint discrimination. The
Court of Appeals declined to discuss the plausibility of Ramsey's
stated reasons for denying Settle's paper, and rejected Settle's
claim at oral argument that Ramsey's reasons were pretex-
tual.'8 ' Further, although the Court of Appeals purported to ap-
ply the Hazelwood standard, it failed to examine Ramsey's
decision through the lens of pedagogy. Under Hazelwood, the
Court must evaluate each of Ramsey's stated reasons to deter-
mine whether Ramsey's denial violated First Amendment
principles.182
2. Analysis of Ramsey's Justifications
A student's failure to obtain permission for a topic in ad-
vance warrants its complete refusal. Ramsey claimed that Set-
tle's failure to obtain permission for the topic in advance
warranted its refusal. This would appear to be an issue of class-
room management probably better left to the teacher's discre-
tion. Nevertheless, a closer inspection of Ramsey's own
statements show that Ramsey would have rejected Settle's pa-
per even if Settle had signed up for the topic of Jesus Christ as
her original choice.'8 3
A junior high school student cannot distinguish between
criticism of written work on a religious topic and criticism of
religion. Ramsey also asserted that Sette's strongly held beliefs
would cause her to interpret any commentary from Ramsey as
criticism of her religion. This justification could be supported
on the grounds that it protects a student from criticism which
she is not mature enough to receive. The district court accepted
this interpretation, citing Ramsey's statement that a fourteen-
year-old would likely feel that the teacher, "just [doesn't] agree
181. See Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (1995).
182. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
183. In a school board meeting Ramsey was asked, "Had the paper on this
subject been the original choice, would you have accepted it?
Ramsey responded, "No, I wouldn't. Just as I wouldn't have accepted one on
Buddha or Mohammed. The papers that seemed to be causing so much problem
are on religious issues and I was presented a religious paper." Pet. for Writ of




with me;.. .that's why I got a bad grade." 18 However, Ramsey's
concern runs counter to the Tinker Court's admonition that,
"school officials cannot suppress 'expressions of feelings with
which they do not wish to contend."' 18 5 If not for the protection
of the student, Ramsey's fear of an uncomfortable situation can-
not justify limiting Settle's expression. In fact, properly admin-
istered criticism can and should help students develop their
writing styles and expression.' 86 In Settle's case it is difficult to
imagine that Settle would be more harmed by perceived per-
sonal criticism stemming from Ramsey's candid assessment of
her paper, than by receiving a zero purely because of the reli-
gious nature of the topic she chose.
Personal religion is inappropriate at school. Ramsey's pri-
mary objection to Settle's paper centered on her belief that per-
sonal religion is, "not an appropriate thing to do in a public
school."'87 Ramsey believed that Settle's paper would be indis-
tinguishable from personal religion because of Settle's strong
belief in Jesus Christ. Two problems arise from this assertion.
First, Ramsey's statement presumes that religion may not be
discussed in public school, a position which neither the
Supreme Court precedent nor the Establishment Clause sup-
port. 88 Second, Ramsey discriminates in terms of who may dis-
cuss a religious topic. Assume A (Christian) and B (Athiest)
prepare a research assignment on a topic of their choice. Ram-
sey's reasoning would forbid A but not B from discussing Chris-
tianity, because for A it would constitute personal religion. In
184. See Pet. for Writ of Cert. at App. 27, Settle (No. 93-6207).
185. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (quoting Judge Gewin in Burnside v. Byars, 363
F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
186. One author suggests six objectives which teachers may follow when cor-
recting student papers:
(1) Give students a reason for wanting to write again;
(2) Help students perceive the process of composing;
(3) Ask students questions about the choices they have made;
(4) Directly point out one or two grammatical, mechanical, or syntax
errors;
(5) Always make suggestions about larger rhetorical strategies;
(6) Encourage students to take more responsibility for their own
learning.
David A. England, Objectives for Our Own Composing Processes-When We Re-
spond to Students, CLASSROOM PRACTICES IN TEACHING ENGLISH (1979-1980).
187. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 4, Settle (No. 93-6207).
188. See discussion supra part I.B.2.
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Settle's case, Ramsey allowed other students to write about top-
ics relating to Buddhism and Hinduism, but only excluded Set-
tle's paper on Jesus Christ. This goes directly to the core of the
type of discrimination that the Free Speech Clause prohibits.
A student's existing knowledge of a research subject will pre-
vent her from learning anything new and discourage her from
doing significant research. Ramsey also claimed that allowing
Settle to complete a paper on Jesus Christ would defeat the pur-
pose of the exercise. Settle could prepare an outline without do-
ing significant research, without taking a dispassionate
approach to the issue, and without learning something unfamil-
iar to her. These reasons resemble the Court's concern in Ha-
zelwood that students learn the lesson that a particular activity
is designed to teach. i 9 Research shows, however, that a stu-
dent's expression of information taught is profoundly influenced
by several factors, including their prior knowledge. 190 Forbid-
ding a student from writing on a subject with which she is fa-
miliar forecloses the opportunity for the student to build upon
what she already knows, and can inhibit rather than encourage
the learning process. Roe notes that the learning process
requires
much more than thinking-schooling also entails extensive listen-
ing, speaking, reading, and writing, in which ideas are advanced,
exchanged, and evaluated. Schooling should provide students
with opportunities to engage in higher cognitive operations be-
cause students cannot be expected to function at such levels un-
less they have the opportunity to employ higher operations in
practice. 191
Additionally, when a teacher precludes only one student
from writing on a subject about which that student has some
knowledge, that signals a stark singling out of one speaker's
message. Ramsey made no general requirement that all stu-
dents write on a topic with which they were unfamiliar.192 If
189. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
190. Fred M. Newman et al., Authentic Pedagogy and Student Performance,
104 Am. J. ED. 280, 285 (1996).
191. Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as
Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L.REv. 1271, 1316 (1991) [hereinafter "Roe"].
192. Compare Sekulow's explanatory note:
This is not to say that a teacher could not further limit the assignment




these risks were not important enough to address to the entire
class, presumably Ramsey could have avoided them in Settle's
case by offering guidance to insure that Settle was performing
research and writing from a sufficiently detached perspective.
Patience, rather than censorship, appears to be the key to help-
ing students develop the analytical skills necessary for higher
education and adult life:
While practicing, students will often fall short of intended
goals by misunderstanding, misapplying, inaccurately analyzing,
poorly creating, and erroneously evaluating the subject matter on
which they are working. If they are to derive benefit from this
practice, students must be able to make errors without fear of
punishment or detriment. Schools must therefore have some tol-
erance for error-and for student speech-when teaching stu-
dents how to think critically.193
The law prohibits any treatment of religious issues in the
classroom. Apart from being incorrect, Ramsey's assertion that
"the law" would require her decision to reject Settle's paper
demonstrates an important point about the relationship be-
tween educators and the courts. 194 The courts properly function
as the interpreters of the Constitution, and teachers as well as
other state officials rely on courts' pronouncements for gui-
dance. 195 When a teacher purports to interpret the law in a
manner inconsistent with precedent, the function of the court
has been undermined. The remedy lies with the courts-in
proper review and decision of a case in which the law will be
clarified. The majority's failure to clarify Ramsey's mistaken
view, when it is the court's function to say what the law is, es-
capes apprehension.
The Bible is the only available source on the life of Jesus
Christ. Ramsey argued that there was no other source on the
suppose a teacher allowed students to pick their own topics for a research
paper, the only proviso being that students must pick a topic that is unfamil-
iar to them. In that case, the teacher could conceivably prohibit a Catholic
student from writing about Catholicism; but he could not prohibit that stu-
dent from writing about Islam, just because the teacher dislikes Islam or
religion in general.
Sekulow, supra note 156 at 1076 n.327 (emphasis added).
193. See Roe, supra, note 191 at 1318.
194. See supra section I.B.2.
195. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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life of Jesus Christ except the Bible, leaving Settle's paper three
sources short of the four source requirement. The Sixth Circuit
interpreted Ramsey's statement to mean "only original
source."1 96 The Bible is not, however, the only original source of
information on Jesus Christ. 197 Moreover, many secondary
sources document the life of Christ. 98 While the Sixth Circuit
observed that Ramsey's reasoning was suspect, the Court con-
cluded that, "all six of Ms. Ramsey's stated reasons" fall within
her broad leeway, "even reasons that may be mistaken."199
This conclusion departs from the Supreme Court's view-
point discrimination jurisprudence, and fails to identify the
pedagogical weaknesses in Ramsey's justifications. Within the
huge gulf of "leeway" envisioned by the Sixth Circuit, even the
most ostensibly invidious discrimination would go unques-
tioned. The Court's opinion left no mechanism for the wrongs to
which it alluded in dictum-the punishing of a student based on
a forbidden factor such as religion-to be redressed in Settle or
in future cases based on similar facts.
C. Freedom of Religion
1. The Establishment Clause
Under the Lemon test, the court would inquire whether
Ramsey's actions had a secular purpose and a principle effect
that neither advanced nor inhibited religion. 200 Ramsey identi-
fied a secular purpose-education-when she denied Settle's
paper. However, Ramsey's denial prevented Settle's expression
on a religious theme and thus had the effect of inhibiting reli-
gion. The only way in which the Establishment Clause could
protect Ramsey's actions would be if Ramsey, by accepting Set-
tle's paper, would have created an excessive entanglement be-
196. Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 154 (1995).
197. See, e.g., FLATvius JOSEPHUS, THE COMPLETE WORK OF JOSEPHUS (Wil-
liam Whiston trans., Kregel 1960).
198. See, e.g., JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN, JESUS: A REVOLUTIONARY BIOGRAPHY
(1994); WILLIAM BARCLAY, JESUS As THEY SAW HIM: NEW TESTAMENT INTERPRETA-
TIONS OF JESUS (1962); JOHN WICK BOWMAN, THE INTENTION OF JESUS (1943); AL-
BERT SCHWEITZER, THE QUEST OF A HISTORICAL JESUS (1910); Jefferey L. Sheler, In
Search of Jesus New Appraisals of His Life and Meaning. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT, April 8, 1996 at 46.
199. Settle, 53 F.3d at 156.
200. 403 U.S. 602 (1973).
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tween religion and the state. As the Supreme Court noted in
Epperson, the mere study of religion or of the Bible presented
objectively does not collide with the Establishment Clause. 201
This suggests that Ramsey herself could have taught on the life
of Christ so long as she presented the material objectively and
as part of a secular program. 20 2 It follows that Settle's written
research assignment posed little threat to the neutrality re-
quired by the Establishment Clause.
Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger also confirm that schools
must tolerate religious views if they tolerate nonreligious ones,
and may not use the Establishment Clause to censor religious
issues. The Dickson School Board's "Religion in the Curricu-
lum" policy guidelines acknowledges that religious expression
should not be eliminated: "Student initiated expressions to
questions or assignments which reflect their beliefs or non-be-
liefs about a religious theme shall be accommodated. For exam-
ple, students are free to express religious belief or non-belief in
compositions, art, music, speech, and debate."20 3 Ramsey's
statement before the Dickson School Board that, "[tihe law says
[teachers] are not to deal with religious issues in the class-
room," evinces a fundamental misunderstanding of the Estab-
lishment Clause. In refusal on the grounds of religious content,
Ramsey was, "dead wrong in her view that Brittney [Settle]'s
paper topic ... is impermissible in the public schools."204
2. Free Exercise and the Nonpersecution Principle
The Supreme Court decision in Lukumi recognizes that the
individual free exercise of religion should be protected from
laws and policies targeted at religious beliefs or practices.
Lukumi would permit a court to look beyond the face of Ram-
sey's policy to its actual operation. Ramsey gave an assignment
201. The circumstances of the particular lesson would determine whether
such a presentation would violate the Establishment Clause. For example, if Ram-
sey had taught on Jesus Christ consistently for an extended period of time, even an
objectively presented study might cast a "pall of orthodoxy" over the classroom.
Epperson, 393 U.S. at 105 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. Of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
202. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at App. 27-28, Settle (93-6207); see supra note 124,
for text of policy.
203. Settle, 53 F.3d at 154.
204. Settle, 53 F.3d at 159 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
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to the whole class, but administered the policy to exclude Set-
tle's discussion of a religious subject from a religious perspec-
tive. Had Ramsey forbidden all students from writing on a
religious topic the Free Exercise Clause might not be impli-
cated. In that case, religionist students would have to demon-
strate that Ramsey intended to restrict religious beliefs and
practices. Settle was prevented from writing on Jesus Christ
because it was a matter of her "personal religion," discussing
her "personal redeemer."2 5 Thus Ramsey's non-neutral regula-
tion of Settle's paper could violate Settle's free exercise of
religion.
Application of Lukumi in this context raises a potential
conflict. Settle's right to free exercise is subject to the school's
right to prevent an excessive entanglement with religion. As
discussed supra, Settle's paper would not have violated the Es-
tablishment Clause. 20 6 Settle's rights are also subject to a gen-
eral requirement that her work be relevant to the assignment.
For example, Ramsey could preclude Settle from submitting an
evangelical rather than informative paper to satisfy an assign-
ment which calls for objective research. The key distinction is
whether Ramsey deemed Settle's paper inappropriate to satisfy
the assignment, or whether she denied Settle's paper because of
Settle's beliefs.
Settle's proposed paper topic, "A Scientific and Historical
Approach to the Life of Jesus Christ," would seem capable of
satisfying the requirements of a research assignment. Given
Ramsey's own statements, it would appear that she excluded
Settle's paper expressly because of Settle's religious beliefs.
Further, Ramsey's policy was not one of general applicability
because Ramsey made no restriction that the other students not
write on topics relating to their personal religious beliefs and
practices-Settle's paper was the only one excluded because of
its religious content. Insuring that Settle learn how to write a
research paper would suffice as a government interest, but
Ramsey's complete ban on Settle's topic would fail the narrowly
tailored requirement. 20 7 Ramsey could have taught Settle to
write a detached research paper through far less restrictive
205. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 4-6, Settle (No. 93-6207).
206. See supra part III.C.




means than forbidding Settle from writing about a figure cen-
tral to Settle's religion. Thus, Ramsey's conduct illustrates the
precise concern that the Supreme Court faced in Lukumi, in-
volving state officials who, "failed to perceive, or chose to ignore
the fact that their official actions violated the Nation's commit-
ment to religious freedom."208
IV. Putting Religious Speech on Equal Ground With Other
Speech.
The Supreme Court has stated that, "[r]eligionists no less
than members of any other group enjoy the full measure of pro-
tection afforded speech, association, and political activity gener-
ally."20 9 In the school context, this guarantee of equality exists
in theory but is less protected in fact.210 Teachers and school
officials need proper information regarding the scope of stu-
dents' First Amendment rights in the classroom.
A. Phenomena of Persecution in the Schools
Settle's case is one of many in which a school official has
singled out and suppressed religious speech. Scholars disagree
on the extent of the actual opposition that students face. Stros-
sen notes that incidences of actual religious persecution in
schools are greatly exaggerated by those affiliated with the so-
called "Religious Right."211 Rather, she warns of the danger of
government involvement in religion when it occurs in the school
context.21
2
On the other hand, lawyers in the field litigating cases on
behalf of religious freedom report that many school officials still
face the problem of how to deal with religious speech. 21 3 Profes-
208. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524.
209. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978)(Brennan, J., concurring).
210. The concurrence in Settle observed: "On the contrary, religious speech,
like all speech, does have a place in the classroom. . The First Amendment man-
dates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion
and nonreligion." Settle, 53 F.3d at 159 (concurring opinion)(quoting Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968)).
211. Nadine Strossen, How Much God in the Schools? A Discussion of Reli-
gion's Role in the Classroom, 4 WM. & MARY BiLL RTs. J. 607 (1995) [hereinafter
Strossen].
212. Id.
213. See Sekulow, supra note 156 at 1018 (discussing the experience of advo-
cates from the American Center For Law and Justice).
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sor McConnell cites several district court and court of appeals
cases which exemplify school officials' attempts to curtail reli-
gious speech. 214 In Guidry v. Calcasieu Parish School Board, a
school principal forbade a class valedictorian from speaking at
graduation because she planned to deliver a portion of her
speech on the importance of Jesus Christ in her life. 215 The dis-
trict court upheld the principal's actions and the court of ap-
peals affirmed on jurisdictional grounds. 216 Similarly in Hedges
v. Wauconda Community School District,217 an eighth grader
handed out a religious leaflet before the start of the school
day.218 The Principal forbade her from distributing the leaflet,
relying on a school policy that prohibited distribution of ob-
scene, pornographic, pervasively indecent, privacy invading,
disruptive, or religious material. 21 9 The district court rejected
the school's policy as viewpoint discrimination. 220 McConnell
concludes that these cases of discrimination against religious
speech are not rare but represent only a small sample of dis-
crimination against religious speakers in schools. 221 Some
schools have even silenced the religious speech of teachers
outside of the classroom. 222
214. See McConnell, supra note 177 at 26-29 (citing cases from the Courts of
Appeal for the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits, as well as District Court cases).
215. 9 RELIG. FREEDOM RPTR. 118 (E.D. La. 1989), affd on jurisdictional
grounds sub. nom., Guidry v. Broussard, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied,
Guidry v. Broussard, 902 F.2d at 955 (5th Cir. 1990).
216. See id. Interestingly, commentators who dispute the claim that students'
religious speech and exercise need greater protection would fail to find an Estab-
lishment Clause violation on similar facts. Peck and Strossen predict that under a
correct interpretation of the Establishment Clause limits on religious speech and
worship, a graduation valedictorian may speak of her faith or deliver a prayer,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's school prayer decision in Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992). See Peck, supra note 160 at 1152. See also Strossen, supra
note 211.
217. 9 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir. 1993).
218. See Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1296.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See McConnell, supra note 177 at 26-29.
222. See Peloza v. Capistrano, 782 F. Supp. 1412 (C.D. Cal. 1992) affd in part,
rev'd in part, 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2640 (1995) (up-
holding school board's written reprimand of high school biology teacher who




School officials persistently fail to realize, despite the
Supreme Court announcements to the contrary, that under the
Constitution religious speech is no less favored than secular
speech. This dilemma is worsened by the Supreme Court's re-
fusal to grant review in cases like Settle, which would define the
limits of school authority to suppress religious expression.
Where constitutional rights are at stake, the schools appear to
be far less suited to determine law than the courts are to deter-
mine pedagogy.
B. At Stake-A Teacher's Right to Control the Classroom?
Policy concerns arise in the classroom context which could
prevent courts from providing ample free speech protection.
Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Tinker expressed his
concern that the Court's decision would eventually lead to a so-
ciety of rebellion, in which students would
defy their teachers on practically all orders... Turned loose with
lawsuits for damages and injunctions against their teachers ...
students will [ I soon believe it is their right to control the schools
rather than the right of the States that collect the taxes to hire
the teachers for the benefit of the pupils. 223
Indeed some argue that the courts' increased involvement inter-
feres with the school's ability to perform its educational
mission.
Particularly in the classroom, judges are wary of attempts
to remove teachers' discretion to make judgments regarding the
curriculum and the grading process. Because of the line draw-
ing problems courts face when interfering with classroom dis-
putes between student and teacher, courts are reluctant to
police even egregious cases of First Amendment violations. 224
The Sixth Circuit compared teachers with judges, acknowledg-
ing that both make mistakes, but suggesting that neither
should be second-guessed. 225 Judges likely associate teachers'
institutional validity with their own, holding teachers practi-
223. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 525 (Black, J., dissenting).
224. Professor Douglas Laycock viewed Settle's case as an example of court's
general reluctance to interfere in classroom conflicts due to the inevitable line-
drawing problems that arise. Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony of Douglas Laycock
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Oct. 20, 1995.
225. See Settle, 53 F.3d at 155-56.
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cally immune from question regarding their classroom
decisions. 226
It is important to remember, however, that the sanctity of a
teacher's decision regarding grades or other matters of curricu-
lum is fostered by the belief that those decisions are neutral and
fair. Grades, for example, are supposed to denote a student's
accomplishments in a particular subject, and not how well the
teacher's personality (or belief system) meshes with that of a
student.227 Courts must enforce the maxim that a teacher may
not limit a student's expression solely because of the religious
nature of the speech. As courts consistently apply this princi-
ple, the law should provide a clearer path for teachers to follow,
and over time lead to fewer First Amendment violations. On
the other hand, less judicial involvement will result in reduced
protection for students' rights, and may lead to the unexpected
result of teaching students the opposite of the democratic values
which the schools are supposed to inculcate. 228
V. Toward a Speech Protective Standard
The Supreme Court's current First Amendment jurispru-
dence does not address how to deal with every aspect of stu-
dents' free speech rights in the classroom. In matters unrelated
to the curriculum Tinker dictates that student speech must be
shown to materially and substantially interfere with the opera-
tion of the school or the rights of the other students. Where the
speech in question is part of the curriculum and the speech may
be attributed to the school, courts must assess under Hazelwood
whether a teacher's actions are reasonably related to pedagogi-
cal concerns. In contexts other than the classroom, the Court's
226. Cf. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (extending to judges com-
plete immunity from suit for decisions made in their official capacity).
227. Eugene T. Connors, Student Discipline and the Law, FASTBACK 121, 50
PHi DELTA KAPPA EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION (1979). Connors predicts that, "[als
long as the grade is an indication of student mastery of subject skills and content
rather than of subjective elements- personality, behavior, and attendance- the
courts will rule for the teacher." Id.
228. See Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship, 95 YALE L. J. 1647,
1680 (1986). But see Roe, supra note 191, who argues that the proper function of




precedent maintains a stringent prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination. 229
In cases such as Settle, in which a student's speech is part
of the curriculum but cannot be attributed to the school, courts
should apply a standard consistent with the Supreme Court's
viewpoint discrimination doctrine. When a teacher limits a stu-
dent's view, the court should inquire whether the teacher's ac-
tions can be justified. Because of the unique context of the
classroom, teachers may have good reasons for discriminating
among views. Thus, courts must take a closer look to examine
whether the teacher was motivated by a valid, educational rea-
son in making the decision. In making this determination
courts can look at the type of assignment or exercise, as well as
the impact the presentation may have on other students. If the
court determines that the teacher has limited the student's ex-
pression merely to suppress a particular view, the court should
invalidate the teacher's action.
On the other hand, if the student's message can be attrib-
uted to the school, courts must apply the Hazelwood stan-
dard.230  Even under Hazelwood, however, courts should
determine whether the teacher's actions are reasonably related
to pedagogical concerns-not mere pretexts raised as post hoc
justifications. This will require an analysis of each of the
teacher's justifications for restricting speech, and such analysis
will necessarily define the limits of a teacher's discretion to re-
strict speech.
Conclusion
Perhaps in the classroom more than in any other arena,
students are vulnerable to the biases of teachers and school offi-
cials. Supreme Court precedent has recognized that teachers
and schools may not suppress speech merely to limit undesir-
able views. Rather, the Court's precedent shows that teachers
may restrict speech which interferes with the operation of the
229. See generally, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia,
115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384 (1993); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Perry Ed. Ass'n
v. Perry, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
230. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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school or the rights of the other students. Schools may likewise
restrict speech within the curriculum that contravenes the les-
son that the activity was designed to teach, and that imputes
the student's message to the school. Schools may suppress stu-
dent speech which collides with its underlying message of de-
cency and appropriate citizenship.
In terms of religious speech and expression, religion consti-
tutes a viewpoint in direct competition with nonreligion in the
"marketplace of ideas." Therefore, a school official may not pro-
hibit religious speech merely on account of its religious nature.
The Establishment Clause demands government neutrality to-
ward religion and may not be used as a justification for a school
to discriminate against a religious view. Further, the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, although not often used in the school context, for-
bids the targeted persecution of a religious belief or practice.
Most can agree in theory that these rights exist for stu-
dents, but the difficulty arises in the context of the curriculum.
In this arena teachers need the latitude to make day decisions
concerning the learning process. An on going tension exists be-
tween the teacher's need to determine the nature of his or her
curriculum, and the student's right to maintain freedom of
thought and expression. Unfortunately, courts appear to resist
their responsibility to protect student's rights when faced with
this tension. Through application of an essentially hollow rea-
sonableness standard, courts can avoid any review of a teacher's
decision to restrict speech.
Particularly in the case of religious speech, viewpoint dis-
crimination threatens to eliminate religious expression from
public schools. Several examples of outright censorship, Settle
being a paradigm, demonstrate that school officials do not un-
derstand the constitutional protection afforded religious speech,
and apparently think that the Constitution condones anti-reli-
gious actions under the Establishment Clause. Courts must de-
velop and apply clear standards to halt this trend and restore
First Amendment guarantees to the classroom. Nothing less
than vigilance will protect students' free speech rights.
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